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A central debate about the transformation of post-communist countries is how the process of institutional change impacts firm restructuring and creation. Two literatures on economic development have largely dominated this debate. The depoliticization approach, often found in economistic and developmental statist views, understands transformation as discontinuous change. A coherent, autonomous state imposes a new "right" set of rules and incentives on a tabula rasa of atomized firms and banks. Sociological approaches tend to emphasize the continuity of past social structures determining firm strategy and policy choices.
The problem is that neither of these approaches offers a convincing explanation for a key development during the 1990s in East-Central Europe: Poland's strong economic growth and the Czech Republic's stagnation. Indeed, advocates of both approaches viewed the Czech case as a relative success and as a major source of supporting evidence.
This essay explains the relative Czech failures and Polish successes in the restructuring and creation of manufacturing firms by offering an alternative embedded politics approach that attempts to connect productive outcomes to the organization of policy-making power. Industrial adaptation is a product of institutional experiments, which in turn are shaped by the relative concentration and diffusion of public power.
In this view, firm and public actors created distinct socio-political networks to obtain resources and to protect themselves during communism from the uncertainties of shortage economies. During the transformation period, firms remain embedded in manufacturing networks but, in contrast to the dominant approaches, are unable to reorganize assets on their own. While vital economic interdependencies constrain firm discretion and assertion of ownership rights, high uncertainty undermines contractual solutions to conflicts over restructuring strategies and asset control. Historical social bonds between firms also fail to mediate conflicts. Past norms of reciprocity depended in part on the political and material
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resources certain firms gained from alliances with regional political actors who now have essentially disappeared. Firm restructuring and creation depend rather on how government policies enable interconnected firm level actors to negotiate over time their overlapping property rights and the reorganization of assets. As with asset workout and risk sharing regimes typical of advanced industrialized countries, these processes demand that public actors mediate conflicts, provide partial financial relief, and monitor the new use of assets by private parties. This paper argues that the Czech government impeded the development of any such role for public actors because of its attempts to maintain a powerful, insulated state and draw a sharp boundary between state and society. In contrast, Polish approaches to privatization, bank restructuring, and even support for new firms facilitated negotiated restructuring and risk sharing because of the way public power was unpacked. A variety of national and sub-national government actors were empowered both to explore new institutional roles to support firm restructuring and creation and to monitor one another.
Section I critiques the two dominant approaches and reviews the main arguments of an embedded politics approach in light of the stark differences between Polish and Czech policies and their manufacturing outcomes. Sections II and III then explore these arguments empirically.
Using primary network data from the Czech Republic, I am able to define the political conditions and policy choices that would impede or aid the reorganization manufacturing networks. 1 I then compare these conditions and choices between Poland and the Czech Republic. (Ragin 1987) I.
Explaining the Divergence in Growth and Firm Creation
By the end of the 1990s Poland was the economic leader in the region, especially over the Czech Republic. Between 1989 and 1998, real GDP grew by 17% in Poland but declined by 4% in the Czech Republic, a difference largely due to relative performance in the restructuring and creation of manufacturing firms. (Kawalec 1999 , Blaszczyk and Woodward 1999 , Klich and Lipiec 2000 Not only did industrial labor productivity increase by three times more in Poland than in the Czech Republic, but also, as can be seen in Figure 1 and Table 1 , the Poles strongly outpaced the Czechs in terms of growth in industrial output and the creation of manufacturing firms, indicated by the growth in employment in small-and medium size firms (SMEs). How can one explain the stark contrast in the industrial restructuring and firm creation?
One explanation comes from depoliticization advocates, who view transformation as a moment of epochal change from communism to capitalism. Depoliticization is the ability of the state to eschew negotiations with economic and social actors about the initial institutional designs and their subsequent revisions. 2 It is achieved when the central state constructs a powerful, insulated "change team" to impose rapidly a new set of economic rules (ideally those of free trade and private property rights) that directly guide atomized firms and individuals toward efficient resolution of restructuring conflicts. Rapid, mass privatization and market liberalization allows various claimants to assets strike "efficient bargains" -i.e., through enforceable contracts, liquidations, and buyouts -so that resources can be quickly directed to fruitful investments and new firms. (Boycko et al. 1995 , World Bank 1996 While one cannot deny the importance of private property rights and market forces, this approach suffers from explanatory problems. First and foremost, by the mid-1990s both independent scholars and the multilaterals viewed the Czech Republic as the crowning success of the depoliticization approach, with Poland as the laggard. (World Bank 1996 , Camdessus 1994 , Frydman and Rapaczinski 1994 , Boycko et al. 1995 , EBRD 1995 (Jarosz 1999 , Blaszczyk and Woodward 1999 , Tang et. al. 2000 As shown in performing loans would grow steadily in the 1990s from 19% to 30% of total loans, they would decline from 30% to 10% in Polish banks. (Tang et al. 2000) By 1999, as creditors made little progress in voluntary workouts, the Czech government was forced to restructure and re-privatize the banks and seven of the largest manufacturing firms. Table 3 shows the extent to which the Poles outpaced the Czechs in the 1990s in terms of several key micro-and macro-economic indicators.
Attempts to save the depoliticization approach try to explain the Czech demise by referring to problems in securities laws and soft budget constraints (Johnson and Shleifer 1999, EBRD 1999 ) and the rise of Polish SMEs by referring to secure property rights (Johnson and Loveman 1995, Johnson et al. 2000) . 3 Yet such arguments not only offer little insight into the creation of financial regulatory institutions but also ignore the fact that into the late 1990s the Polish national and sub-national governments owned and restructured most large firms and banks, leased firms to employees, and created regional development agencies. In turn, the difference in productive outcomes may be less about rapid state withdrawal and privatization per se and more about how governments developed effective oversight capabilities as well as institutional mechanisms to facilitate the reorganization of assets and liabilities.
The dominant competing explanation about restructuring and firm creation during transformation comes from economic sociology. This approach emphasizes the continuity of social structures, namely how the structure, density, and strength of past inter-firm and professional networks help gauge the ability of firms to cooperate, access new information and resources, maintain market positions, and innovate. 4 The work of David Stark is the most prominent here. (Stark 1986 (Stark , 1996 Stark and Bruszt 1998) My alternative, embedded politics approach attempts to identify factors of both continuity and change in firm behavior by understanding how the political-institutional architecture of a country shapes the evolution in the structure and cohesion of industrial networks. Past economic and social ties can initially shape and constrain firm strategy. But the ability of interdependent firms to reorganize these ties and production depends on how countries change the structure of political power to support policy choices about privatization and restructuring. (Johnson 2001) Building on recent research in a variety of East European countries, I argue that upon entering the transformation period manufacturing firms were embedded in socio-political networks, which included regional bank and party council officials. 5 For instance, my own research of Czechoslovak planning in the 1970-80s showed that mid-level institutions, such as industrial associations (VHJs) and regional councils, took on greater decision-making rights over, respectively, production and social-welfare services. (Hayri and McDermott 1998 and Within VHJs, firms and plants developed broad production scopes and tight production and financial interdependencies to limit the uncertainties of shortage. At the same time, managers formed alliances with local state bank branches and party councils to gain privileges from the state center and create informal channels of coordination. These alliances provided certain member firms with political and material resources and thus intra-network bargaining power that solidified the governance of the network.
This view ties restructuring and the redefinition of property rights into a collective action problem. Because of mutual subcontracting linkages or joint use of R&D plants, part of the value of a firm accrues from other firms in a network, and thus firms have limited individual discretion about how to change production. As these firms pursue competing restructuring strategies, conflicts however emerge over production priorities, the use and control of assets, and the division of risk. But resolution is not immediately forthcoming. The lack of information about the returns of a production strategy can be too great for a firm to give credible contractual guarantees to subcontractor or to a bank to finance the investment or a buyout. Past informal rules of reciprocity lose value since they were derived in part from previous public actors who may no longer be available. For instance, in the Czech Republic, while critical suppliers refused to change production for key customers, the main banks found it too risky to lead restructuring, despite their strong financial linkages with industrial firms. At the same time, the centralization of policy making power that virtually eliminated regional and local councils also cut intranetwork bargaining power for certain firms. In turn, the force of past norms was diluted.
Solutions to these collective action problems would appear possible to the extent that the inter-linked actors can purse their different restructuring experiments while gradually redefining property rights and building confidence that each will take into account the interest of the other.
Such processes are often found in institutions of advanced industrialized countries that support asset reorganization and risk sharing. (Cui 1995 , Moss 1996 , Berk 1994 The common emphasis is to aid stakeholders to risky ventures -e.g., firms, workers, and creditors -in simultaneously improving mutual monitoring and employing assets for new uses. To do so, these state-backed institutions provide limited financial breathing room, incentives for a continued flow of resources, and rules for frequent, disciplined negotiations among stakeholders to exchange property rights and information.
Two political-institutional conditions, in turn, arise to foster firm restructuring and creation. First, to the extent that transformation policies promote institutional mechanisms that help parties to assets negotiate their overlapping claims while sharing risk and information, then these actors are more likely to extend their time horizons, reorganize network ties, invest, and build new firms. For instance, privatization may be less about immediate delineation of exclusive ownership and more about how stakeholders and even new outside interests to firms are able to implement new production experiments while gradually exchanging control rights to different pieces of the assets. Bank restructuring may be less about rapid privatization, recapitalization, and liquidation of delinquent debtors and more about how banks and their major clients learn to restructure assets and redefine the terms of their relationships. In both cases certain stakeholders are delegated different restructuring responsibilities but with limited control rights. At the same time they submit to rules of frequent joint deliberations that demand continuous information exchange and mutual evaluation of actions taken. (Sabel 1994) Second, the structure of political power can impede or foster the ability of government to become a needed third party in promoting and supervising such activities. The principles of depoliticization would tend to undermine these processes since the emphasis on the centralization and insulation of political power would stifle the ability of public actors to initiate and monitor solutions to restructuring conflicts. On the other hand, public actors at both the national and sub-national level are more likely to experiment with their new institutional roles to the extent that they have the requisite discretion and resources. Recent research on the development of institutions that promote investment and risk sharing, be they for workouts, new firms, or new technologies, shows that the principles of delegation and deliberation are also central to institutional experiments. (Sabel 1994 (Sabel , 1996a Cohen and Sabel 1997 ) By delegating specific restructuring or privatization responsibilities to relevant public and private actors, the central government obtains agents with superior information to execute policies. Frequent deliberations over the goals and progress of a policy between, say, local government representatives or bank supervisors and the relevant managers forces each to reveal new information, compare results, and improve mutual monitoring over the uses of resources.
The emphasis here is on how the organization of political power helps or hinders banks and firms govern the reorganization of manufacturing networks. As the following section argues, Czech's government's attempt to create and maintain an autonomous, powerful central policy-making apparatus impeded the ability of interdependent firm and bank actors to generate stable collective solutions for asset reorganization. Section 3 then argues that Poland promoted economic reform programs of negotiated restructuring that linked the reorganization of assets with gradual ownership change. Its policies of public administration also gave a variety of government actors the resources and discretion to participate in and monitor these programs.
II. Blocked restructuring in Czech Manufacturing
The Czech depoliticization agenda focused on quickly establishing new incentives for private owners and banks to restructure and create new firms. Rapid, mass privatization, coupled with strengthening of the executive and weakening of sub-national government, would not only limit the blocking power of firm stakeholders but also create new equity owners to discipline management and invest. Once recapitalized in 1991, the main banks could use their new creditor rights and the strict bankruptcy law to cut off problem debtors and lead restructuring. Any conflicts among firms and banks over the reorganization of assets would be resolved through contracts, buyouts, and closures, relieving the government of any active role in the economy.
The case of the Czech machine tool sector is an apt example of why the depoliticization agenda actually undermined the stable reorganization manufacturing assets. In general, scholars have viewed a country's machine tool sector, and more broadly its machinery and equipment branch, as an important gauge of industrial restructuring and exports because of its position in the manufacturing value chain. (Herrigel 1996 , Cohen and Zysman 1987 , Amsden et al. 1994 ) It also has been viewed as a major source of SME creation and flexible specialization worldwide since the mid-1970s. (Piore and Sabel 1984 , Acs and Audretsch 1990 , Carlsson 1989 First, the firms and many plants entered the first wave of privatization mainly via vouchers. Second, they sought to balance individual autonomy with group cohesion by grafting indirect equity and financial alliances onto their past social ties. They converted the directorate of their former VHJ into the headquarters of new machine tool association, SST, in which each firm was an owner. As can be seen in Figure 3 , SST used its historical ties to create overlapping equity holdings with FINOP and CSOB, the Czech leaders of international trade finance, and their new private bank, Banka Bohemia, in key investment funds and foreign trade companies.
SST and the new equity links would provide members with strategic sectoral information and a common coordinating structure in areas where individually they were weak, such as in foreign trade, shared trademarks, critical inputs, vocational training, and development loans.
By 1995, however, the machine-tool network had fragmented and most firms bordered on insolvency. The attempt by SST members to reinforce their past social relationships with equity ties and contracts and also replace past public external partners with new private financial ones did little to promote cooperation and restructuring.
First, the uncertainties of new production experiments created restructuring conflicts between interdependent firms. Given the lack of knowledgeable suppliers and the high costs of total in-house production, SST firms turned to one another for the development or sub-contracting of certain components and the cost sharing of exporting and importing (especially for CNC electronics). Since the strategies of new product development entailed significant risks and often conflicted with one another, no firm could give the contractual guarantees to the others to forego their own plans and invest in those of the solicitor. For instance, even when the solicitor demonstrated that the trial runs were for a credible international client, the small production volumes and poorly defined future revenue streams undermined the credibility of the project. In turn, the potential SST suppliers refused to alter their own component production for the benefit of the solicitor. 
III. Enabling Restructuring and Institutional Experiments in Poland
As Czech restructuring slumped, Polish industrial output and firm creation accelerated, even in the machinery and equipment branch. 7 Though not always intentionally, the Polish approaches to privatization, bank reform, policy-making power contrasted sharply with those of the Czechs.
These differences are summarized in Table 4 . Firm privatization and bank reform policies largely focused on combining restructuring and ownership change. The government effectively delegated to stakeholders limited property rights that also forced them to negotiate with one another over the reorganization and control of assets. At the same time, different central agencies and sub-national governments had the power and incentives to initiate, co-finance, and monitor these activities, often in collaboration with one another. In turn, the Polish transformation approach helped firm and bank actors reorganize their economic linkages, while public actors experimented with their new institutional roles.
Stakeholder Privatization
The 1990 law on Privatization of State Enterprises reinforced the veto powers of worker councils and effectively blocked rapid, mass privatization. But this law also opened two routes of ownership change that delegated partial use and cash-flow rights to stakeholders of mostly medium-sized firms and plants and gave them incentives to negotiate with one another and restructure assets. By the end of 1996, these routes accounted for more than 68% and 52% of non-agricultural and manufacturing firms, respectively, subject to ownership change. Both routes also accounted for more employment than any other route, except for firms commercialized but still with full state ownership. (Jarosz 1999 , Nuti 1999 , Blaszczyk and Woodward 1999 The so-called, "liquidation" route, based mainly on Article 19 from 1981, sent firms through a specialized bankruptcy procedure that focused on debt relief and maintaining employment. Over half of assets in completed projects were restructured, kept as going concerns, and sold or leased to a combination of managers, workers, and outsiders. The socalled, "direct privatization" route came through Article 37 of the 1990 Law and was the largest and fastest. This law allowed employee council to legally dissolve its state firm and then have the assets be sold for cash or in-kind contributions or be leased to a new company, usually comprised of insiders. By the end of 1996, 98% of projects for the 1247 firms in direct privatization were completed, far surpassing the completion rates of all other privatization methods. They accounted for almost 30% of all non-bank privatization revenues. 8 Just over half of the employment in these firms was in manufacturing. Over two-thirds of direct privatization projects were from lease options. Lease contracts were 5-10 years and aimed specifically to result in gradual management-employee buyouts (MEBOs) through the lease payments. The new company had to have at least 50% of employees of the original firm and make an initial down payment of 20% of book value. Research tracking firms in direct privatization has shown that their financial, productivity, and output indicators are better than national and sectoral averages, and by 1998 only 23 MEBO firms had defaulted on their lease payments. 9 Articles 19 and 37, particularly MEBOs, tied asset restructuring directly to the gradual reordering of property rights. This was possible for three reasons. First, Articles 19 and 37 effectively forced multi-party negotiations, be they for creating a MEBO, keeping a firm as a going concern, or limiting political hold-ups during project selection. Such negotiations between potential owners and stakeholders (e.g., work groups, linked plants and firms) not only helped limit asset theft by any individual group but also forced the different claimants to begin to take into account one another's interests, vital for the development of product and process improvements that reach across firms. Second, both routes relieved financial pressure on the firms, in turn providing breathing for firms to experiment with different restructuring strategies.
For instance, lease contracts for MEBOs used below market interest rates and offered the option of deferring initial payments of up to two years. Although MEBO firms had limited access to new capital investment loans, the financial relief typically allowed them to restructure via incremental organizational, process, and product innovations.
Third, rather than cutting itself off from society and monopolizing power, the central government gained a well-placed agent to mediate between different claimants to assets by delegating project approval and monitoring authority to the 49 voivodships (regional administrations). In becoming the legal "founders" of most firms, the voivodships could initiate or block a liquidation petition, evaluated direct privatization projects before they were passed to the central Ministry of Ownership Transformation (MOT) for final approval, and negotiated with MEOB candidates about certain terms of repayment. As they had relatively simple criteria and could maintain much of regional employment, the two privatization routes were politically advantageous for the voivodships. But excesses were monitored not only by the MOT and the 17 regional fiscal audit offices of the Ministry of Interior but also by the relevant gmina (municipality) officials, which were freely elected, had significant resources, and could monitor regional policies in the voivod council. As we will now see in the next two sections, the political and functional interdependencies increasingly connected the reorganization of economic networks with the creation of regional institutional capabilities.
Polish Workouts of Banks and Large Firms
The few studies on Polish manufacturing networks show that renewal of initially acrimonious inter-firm relations emerged in part from sub-national governments supporting collective problem-solving and resource flows from large firms to their SME suppliers. When the growing stock of bad loans to firms threatened financial stability in 1992, the government viewed case-by-case approaches and court proceedings as too slow. The Czech response was a one-time partial bank recapitalization, after which the incentives from rapid privatization, new creditor rights, and the bankruptcy as liquidation law would propel the main banks to lead firm restructuring. The Polish government rejected this approach, arguing that it would not change bank-firm relations or government oversight capabilities and would destroy value in the meantime. Rather, the shipyard cases became the basis of a broader government led workout regime that purposefully tied simultaneous bank and firm restructuring with gradual redefinition of property rights. Whereas the Czech approach, which led to failure and another bailout, would cost taxpayers over 25% of GDP by the end of the 1990s, the Polish approach would cost only 7% of GDP. (Tang et al. 2000) In 1993, the Finance Ministry launched the Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program (EBRP). 10 The government offered seven of the nine main commercial banks (which held about 60% of outstanding enterprise debt) a one-time recapitalization sufficient to deal with classified debts that originated prior to 1992. In return, the banks had to establish workout departments and had to reach a debt resolution agreement with their main debtors by March 1994, to be fully implemented by March 1996. Such an agreement allowed for 5 paths, including demonstration of full debt servicing (about 40% of the 787 total firms), bankruptcy, liquidation, debt sale, and a new regime called "bank conciliation". This last route became the most popular method of dealing with problem firms (23% of firms and 50% of debt) and was widely judged by outsiders as a successful, efficient policy that significantly improved the performance and governance of banks and firms. (Gray and Holle 1998 and Montes-Negret and Papi 1996) Since EBRP, and conciliation in particular, demanded regular government evaluation of decentralized actions taken by banks and firms, the governance principles again were delegation of restructuring authority to stakeholders, multi-party risk sharing, and government monitoring via iterative deliberations among the parties to assets. First, the Deputy Finance Minister purposefully used regular deliberations to enhance monitoring and learning. After receiving the restructuring authority and the basic criteria of EBRP, the lead managers of the workout departments of the seven banks met together every month for over a year with relevant representatives of the Finance Ministry, the Privatization Ministry, the Central Bank's supervisory division, and the state auditor. In these meetings, the banks had to reveal how they were and were not making progress in the restructuring of their own balance sheets and the firms. The collective, iterative evaluation process created a constant flow of information, which government officials and bank managers used to compare and rate one another's actions over time, detect flaws, limit favoritism, and negotiate updated terms of workouts. At the same time, the deliberations allowed the banks to learn from one another the pitfalls and benefits of different restructuring methods and the government actors to learn how to improve their own auditing and monitoring techniques.
Second, a similar negotiation process with creditors, firms, and regional public officials took place at the regional level. For instance, in his detailed analysis of the turnaround in heavily industrialized region of Lodz, Dornisch (1997 Dornisch ( , 2000 notes that the negotiations between the regional bank, voivodship (as the founder of the firms), the local tax office and firm management led to new channels of information sharing. As the voivodship learned to forge compromises between the bank and firms, the three parties extended workout negotiations to include the gradual reorganization of supply networks. As a result, EBRP framework not only helped large firms and their suppliers redefine the terms of their common production lines, but also led the bank to develop new services. The Lodz bank soon developed successful regional equity and venture capital funds out of its workout department. This bank and others also developed special write-off provisions for SME suppliers of the large firms included in EBRP.
Taken together, direct privatization and EBRP created concrete frameworks for stakeholders to pursue restructuring experiments while gradually redefining their common claims to assets. To support and effectively monitor such negotiated solutions, the central government could not isolate itself but had to empower public actors at various levels of society. This marks a third fundamental different between the Polish and Czech approaches to transformation: the distribution of public power. Regional and local governments in Poland were facilitating network reorganization not simply as agents of the central state but also as builders of new institutional capacities in their own right.
Institution Building and the Political Matrix of Sub-National Governments
Both Polish and Czech reformers were highly concerned about continued control by communist apparatchiks of regional and local councils and maintaining a unitary state. But their methods of dealing with them contrasted sharply. 11 The Czechs eliminated regional councils, To become an effective participant in policies like direct privatization and EBRP, a voivodship typically combined its relative authority and organizational resources with the social, informational, and human resources of the regional bank, firms, consultants, gminas and the audit agency. These initial steps became a resource for gminas and economic actors to expand their portfolios of strategies, collaborators and project screening capabilities. For instance, when EBRP was launched, the regional banks lacked effective monitoring capabilities. In turn, they began to supplement their deficiencies by participating in regular voivod council meetings and accessing the voivod data base. The pilot experience in restructuring firms in EBRP, and in some case becoming co-owners of them, led the Lodz Bank and voivodship to co-manage a closed World Bank investment fund for initially 20 firms. (Dornisch 1999 (Dornisch , 2000 This interaction led to a dramatic rise in local and regional public-private institutions, such as 1500 business support centers and 23 mutual loan guarantee funds, to support large firm restructuring, SME growth, and manufacturing networks. (Woodward 2001 , Gorzelak 1998 , Yolum 2001 have found high and strong positive relationships between the density and diversity of publicprivate institutions, on the one hand, and relatively high rates industrial restructuring, participation in direct privatization (especially via MEBOs), SME creation, and the reception of FDI on the other. (Hausner et al. 1995 (Hausner et al. , 1997 (Hausner et al. , 1998 Jarosz 1999) Although initiatives related to RDAs and firm restructuring were often fraught with delays and failures, the political and resource interdependencies demanded that the relevant regional public and private actors continually renew the process of collective problem solving.
( Dornish 1997 Dornish , 2000 In being forced to jointly administer and evaluate privatization, restructuring and development projects early on, the relevant firm, bank, and government actors began to learn about how to monitor one another and share authority over common assets. This experience in turn helped them define a reasonable set of new common projects and how to assess one another's actions and contributions. Institutional development was not coming from a grand design from above but from stakeholders finding ways to address one another's interests while experimenting with new institutions roles for the demands of asset reorganization.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This essay has argued that an embedded politics approach may prove more useful than depoliticization and continuity approaches in analyzing restructuring and firm creation, at least in East Central Europe. Similar to recent work by Woodruff (1999 ), Jacoby (2000 , and Johnson But just as the creation of investor protection institutions demand government oversight and enforcement capabilities, so too do these other institutions demand the creation of government capabilities to initiate and monitor risk sharing programs. The dual challenge for researchers is not only to determine the impacts of such institutions on productive outcomes but also to capture how public actors experiment with these new roles. This experimentation is above all about building up effective monitoring capabilities to learn where government is needed most and how it can ensure efficient use of public funds.
Second, this essay also suggests that organization of political power impacts the governance of institutional experimentation. My discussion of the importance of sub-national administrations was meant simply to illustrate that institutional experimentation requires, at a minimum, the empowerment of a variety of government actors to explore different policy approaches and have the political voice to relay them back to higher-level bodies. There is a significant body of research on advanced industrialized countries (Locke 1995 , Herrigel 1996 , Saxenian 1994 , Piore and Sabel 1984 , developing countries like Brazil and China (Tendler 1997 , Oi 1999 , and even in Russia (Petro 2001 ) that show that sub-national governments play critical roles in facilitating economic development and becoming laboratories for new public policy. At the same time, however, it would be misguided to think that simply decentralization is the answer to development, as it can equally turn into grounds for local strongmen and corruption. Rather, the evidence presented on Poland suggests that effective institutional development comes not only from empowering local public and private stakeholders but also how policies and political institutions are created to enhance mutual monitoring. Indeed, the research on Russia (Woodruff 1999) , China (Oi 1999, Oi and Walder 1999) , Brazil (Tendler 1997) , and Argentina (Jones et al. 2002) has also shown that the differences in the distribution and governance of policy-making power among sub-national governments can account for the ability of countries to initiate and sustain institutional reforms. I have argued that the governance principles of delegation and deliberation may turn the potential for local abuse and self-dealing between public and private actors into benefits for the public welfare. In this view, then the ability of the 1999 reforms in Polish sub-national governments to sustain the gains made in the 1990s would depend on how the reforms supported or undermined these governance principles.
But whether you fully agree or not with that argument, though, is perhaps less important than moving research on economic development away from the ideal designs at the commanding heights and toward the way polities govern institutional change at multiple levels of society. Mins. of Finance & Priv'n build capabilities to initiate and monitor EBRP & gradualist methods of priv'n; Build strong regulations for capital market; Give roles to sub-nat'l gov'ts.
-Sub-national Levels -Regional councils eliminated; -Districts and Municipalities fragmented and weak.
-Voivodships (regional gov'ts) empowered to screen and monitor priv'ns, assist in EBRP, build RDAs; -Gminas (municipalities) work with Voivodships on restructuring, RDAs and bond market. Adapted from McDermott (2002, Chapter 5) .
